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GUILT BEYOND CONVICTION: THE
THEORY OF RESIDUAL DOUBT IN
INDIAN CAPITAL SENTENCING
—Anushree Malaviya* & Rhea Goyal**

Abstract The Indian law on capital sentencing is rife with
conflicting standards, which has made the process of adjudication increasingly discretionary over the years. In an
attempt to reduce such arbitrariness, the Indian Supreme
Court recently borrowed ‘the doctrine of residual doubt’
from the American legal system. The theory is premised on
the idea that the notion of ‘doubt’ is not absolute, but rather
of varying degrees. Viewed in the context of the irrevocable nature of capital punishment, the Venn diagrams of
doubt and state-sanctioned execution must never intersect.
This doctrine attempts to create a higher burden of proof at
the stage of sentencing by precluding the possibility of death
when any ‘lingering doubt’ is found to exist – that is, beyond
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. In this paper, the authors examine the impact of the doctrine on the Indian law on capital
punishment. The authors first study the efficacy (or arbitrariness) of the prevailing tests employed by the Indian courts in
their death penalty jurisdiction. Second, the authors introduce
the doctrine of residual doubt by looking into its origins in
American jurisprudence. Third, the authors attempt to answer
the question as to whether – and how – the theory can provide a fairer mechanism for adjudicating capital punishment
in India. Given the variance between the American jury system and the Indian judicial process, the authors recommend
that the theory ought to be modified through structural and
definitional changes to effectively counter the widening margin of discretion exercised by the Indian Supreme Court. The
theory of residual doubt would thus find legitimacy based on
the moral and legal justification of protecting from death any
individual whose case has not been proved with ‘absolute certainty - that is the existence of ‘no doubt’.
*
**
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I. INTRODUCTION
Nobel Peace Prize laureate Andrei Sakharov sent a letter for the Stockholm
Conference on the Abolition of Death Penalty, wherein he stated:
A state, in the person of its functionaries, who like all people
are inclined to making superficial conclusions, who like all
people are subject to influence, connections, prejudices and
egocentric motivations for their behaviour, takes upon itself
the right to the most terrible and irreversible act - the deprivation of life.1
In India, where capital punishment has not been abolished, one could hope
that the law surrounding it would have crystallised so as to minimise the scope
for any such human error as cautioned in the preceding quote. Unfortunately,
a study of the courts’ decisions would reveal the contrary – the jurisprudence
on death penalty that has evolved over the decades has been both inconsistent and incoherent, leading to excessive dissymmetry in the pronouncement of
such sentences.2
The courts have given unto themselves a wide berth for interpreting the
‘rarest of rare’ doctrine,3 which was propounded exactly four decades ago. One
such permutation has been borrowed from American jurisprudence - the theory
of ‘residual doubt’. This theory creates dual standards of doubt applicable at
the stage of guilt and sentencing in cases that are punishable by death.
The theory posits that although the evidence adduced in a trial might be
sufficient to arrive at a guilty determination using the beyond reasonable doubt
metric, there could still be room for certain ‘lingering doubt’ that makes it
incompatible with a sentence of death. The apparent paradox and literal double-standard has naturally subjected this theory to intense academic debate,
with both the abolitionists and proponents of the death penalty attempting to
navigate the true effect of this doctrine.
It is only in the past few years that this theory has been applied by the
Indian courts. However, the authors will argue that even its sparing employment has paved way for a new chapter in the capital sentencing jurisprudence.
1

2

3

‘Letter from Andrei Sakharov to the Amnesty International Conference on the Abolition of
the Death Penalty’ (Sakharov, 9 September 1977) <https://www.sakharov-archive.ru/English/
Death.htm> accessed 6 July 2020.
Project 39A, ‘Death Penalty Sentencing in Trial Courts: Delhi, Madhya Pradesh &
Maharashtra (2000-2015)’ (National Law University: Delhi, May 2020) <https://static1.
squ a re spa ce.com /st at ic/5a843a9a9f 07f 5ccd61685f 3/t /5ebc3dc 0879c75754ab23f 78/
1589394902371/Death+Penalty+Sentencing+in+Trial+Courts.pdf> accessed 20 June 2020.
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 684 (‘Bachan Singh’).
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This paper shall explore the nuances of the theory of residual doubt and its
impact on the legal landscape relating to capital punishment.
Part II of this paper shall trace certain developments in the death penalty
jurisprudence in India to contextualise the introduction of the residual doubt
theory. In this section, the authors shall look at three principles: the community standard, the balancing test, and the principle of prudence. The primary
objective of this exercise is to expose the conflict between judgments and the
unfettered discretion exercised by the courts in death penalty cases, which
highlights the need for a more uniform standard.
In Part III, the authors shall invite the reader’s attention to the birth of the
residual doubt doctrine in American law and the evolution of its theoretical
parameters. In this segment, the authors will trace the origins of the theory,
assess the developments in interpreting its scope, address the criticisms raised
against the application of the theory, and finally, discuss its operation within
the peculiar paradigm of a jury-system.
Part IV of the paper then scrutinises this doctrine in the Indian context by
taking a close look at various judgments relying on it. After studying the circumstances of its introduction to Indian jurisprudence, this section shall comment on the impact of subsequent judgments that have applied the doctrine.
The next sub-section will look at the effect that this theory has had on the
existing tests employed in capital sentencing. Next, the authors will address
the concerns pertaining to the differences in its application in America and in
India. Lastly, the authors will propose structural and definitional modifications
that could permit a more purposeful and effective application of the doctrine in
India.
Part V of the paper concludes that the theory of residual doubt, when held
to its highest standard of proof, could play a central role in restricting the margin of discretion exercised by courts in their death penalty jurisdiction. The
present form of jurisprudence on the subject is riddled with contradictions,
which has only served to increase arbitrariness in an area of law that demands
the greatest specificity. The theory of doubt has the potential to supress
such arbitrary elements and introduce a fairer process of adjudicating death
sentences.

II. DEATH PENALTY IN INDIA: GUIDING PRINCIPLES
The literature and critique on capital sentencing jurisprudence in India is
extensive – however, for the purpose of this analysis, the authors shall discuss
those areas which provide crucial context to the theory of residual doubt. In
this part, the authors will discuss (i) the community standard, (ii) the balancing
test, and (iii) the principle of prudence.
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A. Community Standard
One of the arguments cited by proponents of the death penalty is premised
on retribution – an individual deserves the extreme punishment of death for
committing a crime so heinous that it threatens the collective security of the
entire community.4 The Indian Supreme Court has taken opposing views on
the justification of capital sentence based on retribution and a community-centric approach.
The starting point for any discussion on death penalty in India is the 1980
decision of the Supreme Court in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab.5 While
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty, the majority propounded
the ‘rarest of rare’ doctrine - the Atlas carrying all capital sentencing jurisprudence on its shoulders. The essence of this doctrine is that life imprisonment
must be the rule and death penalty the exception, when all remaining alternatives are foreclosed.6
However, the court warned against over reliance on the community’s perception of the severity of the crime. They observed that judges too are riddled
with their own set of biases which could influence their construction of the
community’s metric of ethics and extreme depravity.7 Instead, the Court held
that the decision in death penalty cases must be based on ‘well-reasoned’ principles, that is, the principles evolving from earlier precedents.
Three years later, in Machhi Singh v. State of Punjab,8 the Supreme Court
adopted a diametrically opposing view on the ‘community standard’, which
was premised on a palpably retributive intent. The Court justified the punishment of death against those who offend the “society’s conscience.”9 In an analysis void of the operative portions from Bachan Singh regarding the dangers of
adopting such a standard, the Machhi Singh Court instead assumed its role as
a guardian of a hypothetical social contract between members of a community.
According to the Court, the ‘community’ respects the basic principle of reverence of life, for only those members who do not breach it themselves.10 The
Court further stated that when the ‘collective conscience’ of the community is
so shocked by the acts of such a deviant member, the community expects the
judiciary to impose the penalty of death.11
4

5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Chad Flanders, ‘The Case Against the Case Against the Death Penalty’ (2013) 16(4) New
Criminal Law Review 595, 606 <https://heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/bufcr16&div=25&id=&page=> accessed 16 December 2020.
Bachan Singh (n 3).
ibid [209].
Bachan Singh (n 3) [175].
(1983) 3 SCC 470 (Supreme Court of India) (‘Machhi Singh’).
ibid [32].
Machhi Singh (n 8).
Machhi Singh (n 8).
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The conflict in these two approaches has created a bifurcated body of jurisprudence which regards and disregards the community’s perception based on
the proclivities of each court. The shift in this direction is indicative of the
increasing retributive tendency to lay emphasis on the heinous nature of the
crime rather than upholding the sanctity of binding precedents.

B. Balancing the Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances
The majority in Bachan Singh also provided a basic framework for courts
to apply in their determination of sentence: the ‘balancing test’. This suggested
that the aggravating and mitigating circumstances relating to both the crime
and the criminal must be weighed against each other to assess whether the
option of death is foreclosed or not.12
The ‘crime’ test largely focuses on the nature of the crime – for example,
the modus operandi, the vulnerability of the victim, the extent of planning, or
the abhorrent character of the crime, to give a few examples.13 The ‘criminal’
test is employed to contextualise the crime with the history of the accused,
turning to factors relating to the accused, such as their socio-economic status,
age and gender, repentance, possible motivation, state of mind, fairness in the
trial procedure, etc.14 The crime test thus usually constitutes the aggravating
circumstances, whereas the criminal test constitutes the mitigating circumstances.15 However, it is relevant to note that the Court did not indicate any
guidelines with respect to the possible weight age any circumstance would
carry – this, according to the Court, would have to be assessed on a case-tocase basis.
In 2009, the Apex Court pronounced the judgment in Santosh Kumar
Satishbhushan Bariyar & Others v. State of Maharashtra,16 wherein the
accused person’s conviction was based on the statement of an approver and
other circumstantial evidence. Justice S. B. Sinha observed that the Bachan
Singh standard of proceeding in death penalty matters on the basis of
‘well-recognised principles’ could be said to have failed in light of the wide
inconsistencies witnessed in courts in balancing the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances,17 which exposed the arbitrariness of the process.
Thus, there are two possible consequences that could have followed from
this decision: either the courts would necessarily undertake a comprehensive
12
13
14
15
16
17

Bachan Singh (n 3) [201].
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham (2019) 10 SCC 300 [12] (‘Udham’).
ibid.
Udham (n 13).
(2009) 6 SCC 498 (‘Bariyar’).
ibid [109]. The judgment highlights the conflict in various judgements of the Supreme Court,
where different sentences have been given in cases with similar facts. The judgment further
demonstrates the variance in the application of the community standard.
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and exhaustive examination of all death penalty precedents and would only
determine the sentence after having considered each and every aggravating and
mitigating circumstance (that is, applying the balancing test). In the alternative, the balancing test would have to be discarded and substituted with a new
standard altogether.
In the 2013 decision of Gurvail Singh v. State of Punjab,18 Justice
Radhakrishnan suggested a new test: if even one mitigating circumstance was
found to favour the accused, the death penalty could not be awarded:
To award death sentence, the aggravating circumstances
(crime test) have to be fully satisfied and there should be no
mitigating circumstance (criminal test) favouring the accused.
Even if both the tests are satisfied as against the accused,
even then the Court has to finally apply the Rarest of Rare
Cases test (R-R Test)…
The above case rejected the balancing test and marks a clear shift in favour
of a criminal test over a crime test. However, in a subsequent case,19 the Court
found that the above dictum was incompatible with the position taken in
Bachan Singh, as the majority there had warned against any rigid standardisation in determining the question of death penalty.20 We would argue that the
standardisation mentioned in Bachan Singh only warned against illustrating an
exhaustive list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
What would be more relevant to this discussion is instead the explicit rejection of a purely criminal-centric approach in Bachan Singh, that might render
Justice Radhakrishnan’s test per incuriam. However, Justice Radhakrishnan
took the Bachan Singh limitations into account and did not pass his judgment in ignorance, but as a means of evolving the law in line with more
recent developments. We would thus argue that the Court, in Bachan Singh,
was cognisant of the fluidity that pervades capital punishment and noted that
the principles must evolve in tandem with new research and contemporaneous
developments.

C. Principle of Prudence
We must now draw attention to the crystallisation of the ‘principle of prudence’. In the 2008 decision in Swami Shradhanand v. State of Karnataka,21
the Court created a third sentencing option. For all practical purposes, life
18
19
20
21

(2013) 2 SCC 713 [19] (‘Gurvail Singh’).
Mahesh Dhanaji Shinde v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 4 SCC 292.
ibid [19].
(2008) 13 SCC 767 [92] (‘Swami Shradhanand’).
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imprisonment was usually remitted to a period of incarceration of 14 years,
which courts often believed was disproportionate to the crime.
However, the absolute irrevocability of the death sentence was considered
too harsh, given that the aspect of subjectivity in the exercise of discretion
“renders it completely incompatible to the slightest hesitation on the part of the
court.” To resolve this conflict, the Court thus paved the way for a third sentencing option, that is life imprisonment without any commutation or a period
fixed by the court, as opposed to the death sentence.
However, it is in the Bariyar case that Justice Sinha employed the expression “principle of prudence”, defining it as follows:
Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan Singh (supra)
is sound counsel on this count which shall stand us in good
stead - whenever in the given circumstances, there is difference of opinion with respect to any sentencing prop/rationale,
or subjectivity involved in the determining factors, or lack of
thoroughness in complying with the sentencing procedure,
it would be advisable to fall in favour of the “rule” of life
imprisonment rather than invoking the “exception” of death
punishment. [emphasis supplied]22
This rule of prudence has bifurcated into two prongs of reservations in
awarding the death sentence – first, in cases that primarily rest on circumstantial evidence, and second, when there is inconsistency across the different tiers
of the judiciary, (i.e., both horizontal and vertical).
This created a new paradigm in the rarest of rare case model, where the
Court could go beyond the balancing test, and qualitatively examine the degree
of certainty in its conviction by supplying reasons for the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, in August 2015, the Law Commission published its 262nd report on Death Penalty,23 which cited various judgments to
evince that this principle of prudence has unfortunately been flagrantly disregarded by Courts.
The incongruity of law highlighted here in above naturally trickles down to
the trial courts who bear the responsibility of sentencing accused persons to
death at the first instance. A detailed study of the behaviour of the lower courts
across 215 cases relating to the death penalty has revealed that they demonstrate a strong tendency to rely on the case law of the Supreme Court that is
per incuriam, causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.24 Without any
22
23
24

Bariyar (n 16) [149].
Law Commission of India, The Death Penalty (Law Com No 262, 2015).
Project 39A (n 2) 38.

38

NATIONAL LAW SCHOOL OF INDIA REVIEW

33 NLSI R ev. (2021)

clear guidelines framed by either the legislature or the judiciary, the best-case
scenario for those sentenced to death by a trial court is to wait in the gallows,
with the hope that the appellate courts can take cognisance of such incongruities of the law.
Thus, the Indian sentencing law on capital punishments poses several functional problems due to the non-uniform application of various tests – including the community standard, the balancing test, and even the rule of prudence.
However, the common link between these standards appears to be the increasing discretion that each test brings with it. The introduction of the theory of
“residual doubt” in India, thus finds itself caught between the tussle of these
varying standards, with a sombre task of restoring fairness to the process.

III. THE AMERICAN ROOTS OF RESIDUAL DOUBT
The theory of residual doubt in the context of capital punishment sentencing
first originated in the United States.25 In the American legal system,
Residual, or “lingering,” doubt has been defined as (1) actual,
reasonable doubt about guilt of any crime; (2) actual, reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of a capital offence,
as opposed to other offences; (3) a small degree of doubt
about (1) or (2), sufficient to cause the juror not to want to
foreclose (by execution) the possibility that new evidence
might appear in the future.26
This may be contrasted with the metric of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, which
is employed to determine the guilt of an accused.
The standard ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ enshrines that the prosecution in a
criminal trial must establish, based on the evidence, that no other reasonable
explanation is probable other than the guilt of the accused.27 It is noteworthy that the standard does not indicate that ‘no doubt’ exists, but rather that
‘no reasonable doubt’ can be adduced from the evidence on the guilt of the
accused. Critics of this standard of proof are quick to argue that such a high
standard of proof often results in the acquittal of criminals, especially in sexual offences, which are often characterised by the absence of witnesses.28
25
26

27
28

Lockhart v. McCree 476 US162, 181 (1986) (Supreme Court of the United States) (‘Lockhart’).
Christina S Pignatelli, ‘Residual Doubt: It’s a Life Saver’ (2001) 13 Capital Defense Journal
307-08.
<https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1445&context=
wlucdj> accessed 23 July 2020; See also, William S Geimerand Jonathan Amsterdam, ‘Why
Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases’ (1987-88) 15
American Journal of Criminal Law 1, 27.
ibid.
Marilyn Mchanon, ‘Pell Decision: Why Sexual Offence Trials Often Result in Acquittal,
Even With Credible Witnesses’ (The Conversation, 8 April 2020) <https://theconversation.
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However, it is also a commonly held belief that no innocent man ought to
be deprived of his liberty, therefore reaffirming the significance and necessity of meeting a heightened standard in criminal prosecutions.29 The theory
of residual doubt, therefore, acts as a higher burden of proof than the doctrine
of “beyond reasonable doubt”, as it pleads that the death sentence may only be
imposed when there is unimpeachable and indisputable certainty regarding the
commission of the crime by the accused.
Criminal trials in America consist of (a) the ‘guilt phase’ – where the culpability of the accused is determined ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ based on the
evidence presented; and (b) the ‘sentence phase’ – where the punishment is
determined by looking into the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of
the case.30 Fisher31 refers to this as the “threshold standard”, which precludes
the reassessment of the same (or in some cases, new) evidence at the sentence
phase.
Instead, she argues in favour of a “probabilistic standard”, where the punishment awarded to the defendant is proportionate to the nature and quality
of the evidence. The doctrine of residual doubt thus disrupts the commonly
accepted “threshold standard”, which measures the certainty of guilt through a
‘probabilistic’ lens in the sentence phase, and prescribes a burden of ‘no doubt’
to pronounce a death sentence. Especially in view of data that reveals that
nearly 4.1% of the cases are false convictions,32 this increased burden of proof
gains moral justification.
This section of the paper will trace the birth and development of this theory
in America: firstly, by looking into its origins, secondly, by looking at how the
definition of the theory developed, thirdly, by addressing the criticism raised
against the implementation of the theory, and fourthly, by highlighting its significance, if any, to an American jury trial as distinguished from the Indian
legal system.

29

30

31
32

com/pell-decision-why-sexual-offence-trials-often-result-in-acquittal-even-with-credible-witnesses-135932> accessed 18 August 2020.
Jon O Newman, ‘Taking Beyond a Reasonable Doubt Seriously’ (2019) 103(2) Judicature
<https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/taking-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt-seriously/> accessed 22
July 2020.
Elizabeth R Jungman, ‘Beyond All Doubt’ (2003) 91 Georgetown Law Journal 1065 <https://
heinonline.org/HOL/LandingPage?handle=hein.journals/glj91&div=37&id=&page=> accessed
18 August 2020.
ibid 836.
Samuel R Gross et al. ‘Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced
to Death’ (2014) 111(20) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 7230-7235.
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A. Roots of the Doctrine – From Lockett to Franklin
The doctrine of residual doubt can be traced back to the decision of the US
Supreme Court (‘USSC’) in 1986 in Lockhart v. McCree.33 The Court acknowledged that a plea of residual doubt could be beneficial to a defendant and may
caution jurors who are uncertain about the defendant’s guilt to decide against
the death sentence.34
Subsequently, in Lockett v. Ohio,35 the USSC observed that it is the constitutional right of the defendant on death row to urge before the jury any and all
evidence relating to the defendant as well as the crime that might persuade the
jury to grant him a sentence lesser than death. However, Justice Blackmun’s
concurring judgment sought to restrict such evidence only to enable an assessment of the ‘degree’ of participation by the defendant and not to judge whether
the defendant was guilty or not.
Even so, scholars have argued that this decision marked a turning point in
enabling a more fair and equitable process to the determination of the death
penalty in the United States.36 The Court, in the aforementioned case, observed
that any limitations imposed by states as to what mitigating circumstances may
be urged before a jury would be violative of the constitutionally guaranteed
principles regarding the rights of the accused37 - thus, seemingly expanding the
scope of mitigating circumstances ad infinitum.38
However, a decade later, Franklin v. Lynaugh39 heavily diluted the impact
of the Lockett decision and the weightage of residual doubt as an argument at
the stage of sentencing. First, it held that a defendant does not have any constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to instruct members of the jury
on residual doubt, and that it would fall under the domain of individual states
to determine whether residual doubt is an appropriate argument during the
33
34
35
36

37
38
39

Lockhart (n 25).
ibid.
Lockett v. Ohio 438 US 586 (1978) (Supreme Court of the United States).
Jeffrey L Kirchmeier, ‘Is the Supreme Court’s Command on Mitigating Circumstances
a Spoonful of Sugar With a Poison Pill for the Death Penalty?’ (2018) 10 ConLawNOW
65<https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1077&context=conlawnow>
accessed 22 July 2020; See also, Russell Stetler, ‘Lockett v. Ohio and the Rise of Mitigation
Specialists’ (2018-2019) 10 ConLawNOW 51 <https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1076&context=conlawnow> accessed 22 July 2020; See also, Karen A
Steele, ‘Lockett as It Was, Is Now, and Ever Should Be’ (2018-2019) 10 ConLawNOW 77
<https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=conlawnow>
accessed 22 July 2020; See also, Margery Malkin Koosed, ‘Averting Mistaken Executions by
Adopting the Model Penal Code’s Exclusion of Death in the Presence of Lingering Doubt’
(2001) 21 Northern Illinois University Law Review 41 <https://commons.lib.niu.edu/bitstream/
handle/10843/21832/21141KoosedpdfA.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=> accessed 23 July 2020.
ibid.
ibid [68].
Franklin v. Lynaugh 487 US 164 (1988) (Supreme Court of the United States).
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sentencing hearing.40 Second, that the defendant was not precluded from presenting evidence relating to his character or the circumstances of the crime,
but they did not have any vested right to re-agitate the question of guilt. Third,
the majority acknowledged that although juries might be instructed to consider
any and all evidence as per Lockett, residual doubt may not be a sole ground to
reject the death sentence.
Further, in her concurring judgment, Justice O’Connor has argued against
categorising ‘residual doubt’ as a mitigating circumstance. Instead, almost
counterintuitively, she has advocated for a probabilistic sentencing structure
wherein “punishment should be directly related to the personal culpability of
the criminal defendant.”
Despite the fact that Franklin denied ‘residual doubt’ the status of a constitutional right, it has since been employed by various sates as detailed
hereinafter.

B. Post-Franklin Developments
The post-Franklin era witnessed dissonance between the varying positions
adopted by states on residual doubt. States were left to decide whether residual doubt may be argued by a defendant, and even when it was permitted as
a plea, the Courts could decide to not give the jury a specific instruction on
residual doubt as the same is not protected under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.41 This has led to a variance in the application of residual
doubt as a mitigating factor in states where it has been recognised as a valid
argument.
A few states such as New Jersey mandated written and oral arguments on
residual doubt.42 Others such as Tennessee43 and Ohio44 held that residual doubt
is a valid non-statutory mitigating factor in the penalty phase for the jury to
weigh. Virginia has also failed to recognise any argument relating to a plea
of residual doubt,45 and the Supreme Court of Florida has taken the consistent
view stating that residual or lingering doubt is not an appropriate non-statutory
mitigating circumstance.46
40
41
42

43
44
45

46

ibid.
Franklin (n 39).
Talia Fisher, ‘Conviction Without Conviction’ (2012) 96 Minnesota Law Review 833 <https://
scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/399/> accessed 23 July 2020. The state of New Jersey in the
State v. Biegenwald 594 A2d 172, 197 (NJ 1991) (Supreme Court of New Jersey) mandated the
presentation of oral and written residual doubt arguments during the sentencing phase.
State v. Mckinney 74 SW3d 291 2001 (Supreme Court of Tennessee).
State v. Garner 656 NE2d623 1995 (Supreme Court of Ohio).
Talia Fisher, ‘Comparative Sentencing’ (2009) Social Science Research Network <http://dx.doi.
org/10.2139/ssrn.1488345> accessed 8 January 2021 (‘Fisher: Comparative Sentencing’).
King v. State 514 So 2d 354 (1987) (Supreme Court of Florida).
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The Supreme Court of Virginia, in Frye v. Commonwealth,47 held that
a defendant cannot contest the correctness of a guilty verdict at the sentencing stage. In Stockton v. Commonwealth,48 it was held that a defendant is not
permitted to present evidence of residual doubt from the guilt-phase during
the sentencing phase. In Atkins v. Commonwealth,49 the Court reiterated that
defendants cannot present evidence of residual doubt during sentencing.
In 2006, the USSC once again had the opportunity of defining the parameters of a residual doubt plea in Oregon v. Guzek.50 The plurality presented
three circumstances that are relevant to define what evidence may be presented
at the stage of sentencing: first, that the sentencing theory is concerned with
how the crime in question was committed and not whether it was committed
at all, which is only of relevance in the guilt-determination stage. Second, that
the issue in question had already been litigated and determined before, that is,
whether the defendant committed the crime in question. Third, that Oregon
law permits the defendant to present any and all evidence pointing to the innocence of the defendant from the original trial phase.51
In his separate but concurring opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the third
circumstance mentioned in the majority’s opinion runs counter to the first two,
and as such, arguments relating to the evidence of the crime in question ought
not to be raised at all - essentially erasing any right to present evidence on
residual doubt at the stage of sentencing.52
Justice Scalia is correct to the extent that the third circumstance - which
speaks of an unqualified ‘all’ evidence - is incompatible with the first and third
circumstances that seek to restrict its application. The plurality appears to have
enabled an intersection between the ‘threshold’ and ‘probabilistic’ standard,
but with a clear bias towards the former, as it prevented any post-conviction
arguments on evidence that might help determine the potential innocence of an
accused.
The weightage accorded to a residual doubt argument also varies from state
to state. In USA v. Gabrion,53 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Ohio)
interpreted the exercise of sentencing and appreciation of mitigation evidence
to be a moral duty, that is defined by both the crime and the criminal. In this
case, the accused argued that there was lingering doubt regarding the location
of the alleged murder. The Court dismissed this argument on the logic that the
47
48
49
50
51
52
53

Frye v. Commonwealth 345 SE2d 267 (Va 1986) (Supreme Court of Virginia).
Stockton v. Commonwealth 241 Va 192 (Va 1991) (Supreme Court of Virginia).
Atkins v. Commonwealth 534 SE2d 312, 314 (Va 2000) (Supreme Court of Virginia).
Oregon v. Guzek 546 US517 (2006) (Supreme Court of the United States).
ibid.
ibid.
USA v. Gabrion 719 F3d 511 (6th Cir 2013) (Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit).
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location of the crime did not form a critical element of the crime itself, and
therefore any sense of dubiety in its regard would be redundant.
Thus, it rejected the conceptualisation of residual doubt to be limited to
“any doubt whatsoever”, but instead to be a “doubt of certain significance”.
However, interpretations such as this run counter to the purpose of residual
doubt, which is intended to decrease the parameters of discretion. Instead, by
attaching a qualification of ‘certain significance’, the jury is burdened with
distinguishing between ‘reasonable doubt’, ‘no doubt’, and ‘doubt of certain
significance’.
This doctrine has gained legitimacy in some American states, with both the
Franklin and Oregon decisions acknowledging that nothing precludes such evidence from being presented to the jury. However, some states do not give any
consideration to the doctrine of residual doubt, as they believe that a verdict of
guilty cannot be challenged at the sentencing phase.

C. Criticisms against Residual Doubt
There are some fair reservations that have been raised against the application and definitions of the theory. Some critics of residual doubt argue that an
application of two different standards of proof to ascertain the culpability of
a defendant with regard to the same criminal act is legally unsound and arbitrary. On the other hand, supporters of the residual doubt metric urge that
the nature of death penalty is unlike other punishments in that it cannot be
reversed.
The death penalty offers no scope for future correction, and therefore, the
need for certainty with regard to the guilt of the accused assumes paramount
importance. The adoption of different standards at the conviction and sentence
stage sits ill at ease at the very first blush, as it seems to enforce contrary
views on the guilt of the accused. However, academics54 urge that the adoption of the theory of residual doubt standard only at the stage of sentencing is
necessitated due to the irreversibility of capital punishment, and that in view of
any lingering doubt, innocent people should not be sentenced to death.
It has also been argued that the application of the theory of residual doubt
could open the floodgates for other grievances regarding the culpability of the
defendant.55 For example, it permits defendants to urge before appellate courts
that the residual doubt used to award a sentence lesser than death ought to
be employed at the stage of conviction to acquit the defendant. However, this
54
55
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argument lacks compassion and places greater importance on the possible misuse to delay litigation vis-à-vis the right to life of an individual.
Further, as highlighted earlier,the question regarding the definition and
scope and ambit of the theory remains unanswered. From Lockett to Franklin
and Guzek, the USSC has consistently whittled down the strength of a residual
doubt plea. The conflict between states has led to varying rules, limitations,
and weightage to the application of the theory. Due to the final discretion to
permit such a plea resting with the courts, the defendants are left at the mercy
of what a court may find to be appropriate or necessary instruction in a given
case.
Some academics56 urge that ‘any lingering doubt whatsoever’ should be the
standard adopted to award sentences lesser than death to all such defendants
who are able to evoke ‘lingering doubt’ of their guilt before the jury. However,
the Gabrion decision exposed that evidence which might be considered as
residual doubt by some juries to grant a sentence lesser than death, could conversely be considered by other juries as not compelling.57 The lack of a uniform understanding of what constitutes ‘residual doubt’ continues to contribute
to arbitrariness in the application of such a metric in sentencing hearings.
Lastly, although residual doubt might reduce the incidence of death penalties, especially in case of false convictions, it might increase the number of
convictions of life imprisonment in cases where a jury might otherwise have
acquitted an accused.58 This argument is largely presumptive and fails to find
basis in any data or evidence. Moreover, states such as Florida, where there is
no mandate to consider residual doubt, have evinced that specific instructions
to this effect does not necessarily mean that it does not weigh with the jurors.
Therefore, the assumption that it could lead to increased convictions might be
misplaced.
Despite the reservations highlighted above, the theory challenges the threshold model and compliance of the same in absolution. It breaks the binary phenomenon of guilt as envisioned by the threshold model and challenges the
‘all-or-nothing’ sentencing structure that prevails in the criminal systems in
American and Indian Courts. The theory of residual doubt thus creates a direct
link between the certainty of guilt and severity of punishment, and such a metric is a perfect example of a probabilistic approach to sentencing.59
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Further, although several states preclude jury instructions on residual doubt,
it is found to be the strongest mitigating factor used by juries in America to
ascertain the appropriate penalty for defendants facing capital punishment.60
After surveying thousands of capital jurors, the Capital Jury Project61 found
that residual doubt was the most compelling factor for jurors to choose life
sentence over capital punishment.62 A study also found that raising doubts
about the guilt of the defendant at the sentencing hearing urged 60.4% of the
jurors to award a sentence lesser than death.63
Intuitively, the adoption of different standards at the guilt and sentencing
phase might appear antithetical as it makes one pass a judgment while harbouring opposing views on the guilt of the accused.64 But if such a standard
is necessitated in view of the harshness and irreversibility of the death penalty,
then what is the impediment in the adoption of the standard of residual doubt
taken to its full extent?

D. Conditions Peculiar to the American Jury Trial
Unlike the Indian legal system, the American legal system follows a jury
system, where jurors decide in favour of the plaintiff or the defendant in a civil
case, or between guilty or not guilty in a criminal case. Jurors in a criminal
case also decide whether the accused ought to be given a sentence of death.
The jurors hearing a case are given what are called ‘jury instructions’,
wherein they are guided on what verdict to arrive at, based on what facts they
ascertain to be true.65 The jury is informed about the relevant laws and their
application in order to arrive at a verdict.66 The members constituting the jury
are persons with non-legal backgrounds, and therefore, the jury instructions
assume a significant role in such a legal system.67
60
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Secondly, some would argue that a jury would be at greater risk of getting
swayed by their emotions as opposed to judges, who are supposed to be dispassionate to external factors and their personal beliefs. Jurors bring with them
their beliefs and biases to the jury room, and therefore, the weight assigned by
jurors to mitigating circumstances varies.68
However, this argument does not consider two factors that could potentially
negate it. One, that the members of a jury for a case punishable by death, or
‘death-qualified juries’, are specifically picked to weed out any such persons
who hold strong views either for or against the death penalty. Two, that the
assumption that judges are free from personal biases is naïve and not founded
in fact. In India, where judges alone decide the capital punishment, a recent
report69 revealed that an overwhelming number of trial courts cite “collective
conscience” or “society’s cry for justice” in their decisions on death penalty.70
Thirdly, another feature that contrasts the Indian legal system from its
American counterpart is the complete absence of judicially mandated collection
and presentation of mitigation evidence.71 In the United States, capital punishment cases mandatorily entail the involvement of a mitigation specialist.72
Sentencing hearings without the presentation and collection of mitigation evidence are inadequate to say the least, and do not provide an equitable hearing
to the accused.
Fourthly, the constitution of a jury might change between the phases of a
trial. Thus, it is possible that the jury that convicts someone of a crime is not
the same as the one that determines their sentence. However, in Buchanan
v. Kentucky,73 the USSC recognised the importance of a single jury in cases
where a plea of residual doubt may be raised in capital sentencing. The Court
observed that the need for a single jury was accentuated as it would enable the
jury to consider any lingering doubts they may have harboured during the trial.
The idea that there remains some degree of doubt regarding the guilt of
a defendant affects the very fundamentals of sentencing verdicts. Residual
doubt appeals to the common sense, and often acts as a de facto mitigating
circumstance with juries opting to give a lesser sentence if persuaded about
68
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the existence of residual doubt.74 Despite attempts to dilute the importance of
the theory and questions surrounding its implementation, the theory of residual doubt has proved to play a central role in American death penalty jurisprudence and has saved the lives of countless defendants. The next segment of
this paper will study the transposition of the theory from American to Indian
jurisprudence, and will assess its efficacy in that context.

IV. EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
IN INDIAN JURISPRUDENCE
Part II of this paper had highlighted some of the guiding principles in
Indian capital sentencing, which reflected excessive discretion in the process
due to inconsistency in standards and their application. Part III of the paper
introduced the residual doubt doctrine as developed in the American legal system. This segment of the paper shall argue that the theory of residual doubt,
when redefined to address the issues of the Indian legal system, could be a
powerful antidote to the arbitrariness of the sentencing process. The authors
will explore (a) the introduction of the doctrine into Indian jurisprudence; (b)
its definition and scope in India; (c) its impact vis-à-vis the tests discussed in
Part II; and (d) suggestions to improve the application of the doctrine to suit it
to the issues that confront Indian capital sentencing.

A. Ashok Debbarma and the Introduction of Residual Doubt
The first example of this doctrine in India is found in the case Ashok
Debbarma v. State of Tripura,75 wherein the appellant was booked, inter alia,
for murder under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The broad allegation was that the accused, along with thirty five others, had set fire to several
homes which had resulted in the death of fifteen persons. The Supreme Court
confirmed the findings of the Trial Court and the High Court, stating that the
involvement of the appellant in the said crime was undeniable and had been
proved beyond reasonable doubt. However, the prosecution had not been able
to prove the case against any of the others.
Turning to the question of sentencing, the Court drew a distinction between
two thresholds: proof beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ while determining the conviction, and ‘residual doubt’ at the stage of sentencing. The Court found that
since the original case of the prosecution - that is, 35 persons had committed the said crime - had not been proved, this generated a ‘residual doubt’ as
to whether the appellant alone could have committed the crime.76 The Court
declared that such residual doubt would have to form a part of the mitigating
74
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circumstances, and accordingly, the sentence of the accused was commuted to
life imprisonment.77
However, the court did not stop there: Justice Radhakrishnan reiterated and
emphasised the importance of his test in Gurvail Singh, according to which,
if even one mitigating circumstance is found to favour the accused, the question of giving the penalty of death is entirely foreclosed.78 This weightage to
mitigating circumstances – including residual doubt - is particularly significant, especially when contrasted with Justice O’ Connor’s concurring opinion
in Franklin, where she failed to regard residual doubt as a mitigating circumstance at all.
The Debbarma case thus suggested the following process to courts seized
with the question of a possible death sentence:
Firstly, they must determine if the ‘crime test’ has been satisfied upon a
perusal of the aggravating circumstances. If the court answers the question in
the affirmative, they must see if any other mitigating circumstance favouring
the accused exists. Only if there is no mitigating circumstance, can the court
apply the “rarest of rare” doctrine to determine whether the case justifies the
awarding of a death penalty.
However, while looking into the mitigating circumstances, if the court is
of the view that the facts and evidence of the case evoke any lingering doubt,
then that can be a sole circumstance to grant life imprisonment over the death
penalty. A plain reading of this judgment would thus reveal the introduction of
a heightened burden on the courts to meet the standard of ‘absolute certainty’
in its capital punishment sentencing.
Another aspect of this judgment which has strangely not received any attention, is the manner in which the Court extrapolated the American law - with
almost no significant analysis. The Court cited an extract from the Franklin
decision - acknowledging that it is “generally, not found favour by the various
Courts in the United States.”79 It also cited the case of California v. Brown,80
which stated that nothing in the cases before them demanded an application
of a “heightened burden of proof at capital sentencing.”81 In fact, the two
American judgments cited by the Debbarma Court do not recommend a mandatory standard of residual doubt. Yet, without expanding on the context of its
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application in India, which follows a distinct legal system, the Court mechanically applied this theory to the case.
A closer look at the nature of doubt in this case would reveal that it is in
consonance with the reasoning adopted in Franklin and Guzek, where the
USSC had held that ‘residual doubts’ at this stage must be concerned with
how and not whether the crime has been committed. It is therefore not clear
whether the Court adjudicating Debbarma intended to restrict the definition in
those terms or whether it chose to leave it open to subsequent interpretation.
This line of (non) reasoning begs the question of how one can determine
which cases and evidentiary lapses would amount to lingering or residual
doubt. A literal and intuitive interpretation would suggest that any doubt, however remote, including the most minor of inconsistencies in the investigation
and trial, would render the application of the ‘residual doubt’ principle applicable to a given case. However, as the next sub-section will detail, the developments since the Debbarma decision have not consistently followed the above
parameters while considering residual doubt.

B. Scope and Definition of Residual Doubt
On October 1, 2019, a three-judge bench of the Supreme Court delivered the
judgment in Sudam v. State of Maharashtra,82 which marked the first instance
since 2014 where the doctrine of residual doubt was explicitly applied to commute a death sentence to life imprisonment for the murder of four children.
The Court found that the nature of circumstantial evidence and the possibility
of incorrect observations relating to the victim’s injuries would be a significant
enough mitigating circumstance.83
What distinguishes this case from Debbarma is the interpretation of residual doubt, which attaches a qualitative condition to the nature of doubt – one
of significance – and therefore serves to dilute the theory from the original
iteration proposed.84 In fact, by requiring the residual doubt to have greater
relevance, the Court blurs the boundaries between the ‘reasonable doubt’ and
‘residual doubt’.
This yields a greater probability of the unintended consequence of increased
convictions: a court that would otherwise acquit someone on ‘reasonable doubt’
82
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now might favour conviction, while granting life imprisonment over the death
penalty based on ‘residual doubt’. This highlights the need for an absolute and
unqualified degree of certainty that renders the slightest flaw in any evidence
- relating to the crime, criminal, or even the trial process - subject to the residual doubt theory. Without clarifying the distinction in the standards of doubt,
both reasonable and residual doubt standards will be left without any valuable
meaning.
Soon after on October 3, 2019, Justice Surya Kant delivered two judgments
sitting on a three-judge bench, both of which upheld the conviction of the
accused. The first is Ravishankar v. State of Maharashtra,85 where the appellant had been accused of the kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 13 year-old
girl. Here, the Court noted that there were certain aberrations in the evidence
adduced, including a suspect absconding, non-examination of viscera samples,
and minor inconsistencies in testimonies. According to the Court, the slight
imperfection in the evidence, although not enough to disrupt the chain of circumstances, cast enough doubt to commute the sentence to life imprisonment.86
The most recent decision on residual doubt was delivered on November 2,
2020.87 Although the sentence here was commuted to life imprisonment on
other grounds, the Court did not accept the argument of residual doubt. The
Court further observed that even in American law, the theory of residual doubt
does not carry much weight.88 It was found that the chain of circumstances had
been proved with unimpeachable clarity.89
Since there appeared to be no other alternative, the Court found with absolute certainty that the accused was in fact guilty.90 However, one of the factors cursorily mentioned while commuting the sentence was that the Ordinance
making the offence punishable by death had only been issued a few days prior
to the incident.91 Such instances of human hesitation, which could arise from
factors outside of merely the quality of evidence, could be covered by adopting
a wider definition of the residual doubt theory.
What emerges from the aforementioned analysis is that the Courts have
not yet engaged in a detailed discussion on the exact scope and weightage
of a residual doubt argument. The two critical questions to be answered are
regarding the nature of doubts that the theory would extend to, and in what
85
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situations, if at all, the residual doubt argument would take precedence over
any other factor.

C. Effect on Existing Tests
In this section, the authors will address whether and how the introduction of
residual doubt would have any impact on the other principles in Indian capital
sentencing.
In Sudam, the Court appears to have conflated the principle of prudence and
that of residual doubt. The court found that the latter is merely a reiteration of
the rule of prudence, which cautions a court against passing a death penalty
in cases that rest purely on circumstantial evidence.92 While it might be correct that cases resting on circumstantial evidence might fall within the scope of
residual doubt, the reverse is not necessarily true.
There could be other deficiencies in a case that justify the application of
this theory – for example, the High Court of Calcutta found, inter alia, that
non-compliance with procedure, failure to conduct appropriate forensic tests,
and minor contradictions in statements, raised lingering doubt in the mind of
the court, which justified commuting the sentence.93
Further, even in cases based purely on circumstantial evidence, the Court
has found on several occasions94 that it cannot be a sole ground to commute
the death penalty. The principle of prudence could thus be subsumed by the
residual doubt theory, but it would be fallacious and in fact, dangerous to for
the courts to equate the two as the same.
Additionally, the Sudam Court also ignored the critical reasoning performed
in Ashok Debbarma, relating to the erasure of the balancing test. The Court
found the residual doubt to be “significant enough to tilt the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the petitioner’s favour”, viewing it as
one of the mitigating factors to be considered, as opposed to a sole mitigating
factor that would justify commutation.
The implication of this interpretation in Sudam is realised more acutely
when contrasted with the ‘community standard’. In Ravi v. State of
Maharashtra,95 the Court completely ignored the theory of residual doubt and
the rule of prudence, and instead solely focused on the heinous nature of the
crime. Interestingly, the primary difference in facts between Ravishankar and
Ravi was the age of the victim. In Ravi, the appellant had been accused of the
92
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kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 2-year-old girl. The Court did not engage in
any discussion relating to the possible mitigating circumstances and upheld the
sentence of death purely from a “crime-centric” approach.96
However, more significantly, one of the judges on the bench, Justice
Subhash Reddy, rendering a dissenting opinion, highlighted the disregard to the
rule of prudence and residual doubt. The analysis by Justice Reddy took due
note of the fact that the entire case of the prosecution was premised on circumstantial evidence alone,97 and emphatically took into account the “criminal”
test, by noting the weak socio-economic status of the appellant,98 thus upholding the principles of residual doubt and prudence. Again, unlike the Debbarma
Court which suggested that even a single mitigating circumstance is sufficient
to preclude a sentence of death, the majority in this case only focused on the
“crime test”.
Since Bariyar, the Supreme Court has made attempts to displace the existing standards with one that can ensure greater fairness and less discretion in
the process of death sentencing. The residual doubt holds the potential of being
that standard – however, the multiplicity of tests and guidelines has created a
situation where Courts choose a standard that best suits their sensibilities qua
a case. Later in this section, the authors will make suggestions on how the theory might be modified to reduce the instance of conflicting standards.

D. Differences Between Residual Doubt in India and America
In the Meshram case, the Court compared the theory in the context of an
American jury trial as opposed to the Indian judicial system99 – something
which had been overlooked till this point. Quite fairly, the Court found that
the jury system vastly differs from the trial procedure in India.100 Some of the
Court’s reservations, including the tendency of jurors to get swayed by their
sentiments, and the effect of the change in the constitution of jury members,
have already been addressed in Part II of this paper.
Additionally, the Court noted that in America, the determination of conviction and sentence is usually in the hands of non-legal minds, where as in India,
the adjudicatory process is solely governed by judicially trained judges.101 In
this light, the Court in Meshram, suggested that the need for jury instructions
on residual doubts was greater in the USA than in India, as the possibility of
errors would be higher when a jury decides a verdict.
96
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However, this analysis discounts the fact that while the processes of the two
jurisdictions might have stark differences, the underlying commonality remains
that both a jury and a judge are subject to human doubt, and more importantly,
the facts and evidence in most cases are not unimpeachable. This fact holds
true regardless of whether a judge is to decide the penalty or a juror.
Another reservation raised by the Court pertained to the bar in American
trial on presenting new evidence at the stage of sentencing as decided in
Guzek. The Court argued that this restriction is not found in India, where
if new compelling evidence comes to light, it might also be presented at the
appellate stage. The Court reasoned that due to this unique feature, the need
for a residual doubt plea is stronger in the United States than in India.
However, it may be noted that in 2004, the United States Congress passed
the Innocence Protection Act which permits defendants to plead new DNA evidence post-conviction, in view of the concerns regarding wrongful convictions
in death penalty cases.102 Further, the Court in the case of House v. Bell,103
specifically permitted a plea of ‘actual innocence’ based on new evidence that
emerges post-conviction.
Therefore, we argue that for the reasons stated above, the need for a residual
doubt plea would stand as much ground in India as it would in America.

E. Structural and Definitional Suggestions
In what form then should the theory be tailored so as to suit the conditions of Indian jurisprudence? The authors would suggest that the law requires
both structural and definitional changes to act as an effective tool against the
increasing margin of discretion.
Firstly, it may be noted that America follows a ‘bottom-up’ approach,
wherein the discretion regarding residual doubt vests with the states, which
then legislate and provide guidelines to district courts. However, the absence of
specific guidelines by the Indian Supreme Court directing trial courts on how
to navigate issues concerning the consideration of mitigating circumstances has
led to arbitrariness in meting out the death penalty.
Although the Debbarma Court followed the dictum propounded in Bachan
Singh, it introduced for the first time a mitigating factor, which had not been
considered by Indian courts up till that juncture. What was lacking in the
Debbarma decision was the mention of guidelines, similar to jury instructions,
102
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on how lower courts must weigh and consider residual doubt as a mitigating
factor during sentencing.
To take this one step further, the authors would suggest that such a consideration of residual doubt ought to be mandated in each case. This would be
crucial in suppressing the tendency of lower courts to place greater emphasis
on other factors such as the ‘community standard’, as discussed in Part II of
this paper.
Secondly, with regard to the definitional concerns, while some courts have
found the threshold of doubt in capital sentencing to be that of ‘absolute certainty’,104 other courts continue to focus on the ‘collective conscience’105 and
heinous nature of the crime alone.
To resolve such definitional ambiguities, the authors would propose the following changes:
(i) Weightage: For the doctrine to find a non-discretionary application, it
must be formulated without attaching qualifications or weightage to the
degree of doubt. As noted in the Sudam judgement, the Court attached
the qualification of significance to the doubt. The consequence of this
interpretation can be seen in the Ravi case, where despite certain aberrations in the evidence, the weightage accorded to the ‘heinous nature’
of the offence prevailed over the conscience of the Court.
(ii) Erasure of the balancing test: At its core, the theory of residual doubt
precludes a death sentence notwithstanding the prevalence of any other
circumstances of the case. The basic principle of ‘reverence of life’,
when there are any doubts surrounding an accused person’s innocence,
is thus incompatible when outweighed by any other consideration. It is
therefore important to categorise residual doubt as a sole mitigating circumstance that may justify the exclusion of a death sentence.
(iii) Nature of doubts: The discussion on residual doubt relates primarily to
the nature and quality of evidence provided during (and in some cases,
after) a trial. The authors propose that the assessment of doubt should
not merely be restricted to the evidence presented in a given case but
should be understood to subsume any and all doubts which relate to the
case. This could include doubts relating to the process of trial, efficacy
of counsel, dissent by judges, or other circumstances surrounding the
crime.
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Thus, the correct standard according to the authors would be that any doubt
whatsoever ought to be reason enough not to grant the death penalty. A purposive interpretation such as this would permit residual doubt to be applied in
order to reduce the discretion exercised by judges, and substitute a subjective
test based on the nature of the crime with an objective exercise of studying the
quality of all evidence and surrounding circumstances.
The authors are cognisant that this high standard of proof for the death penalty would make it nearly impossible for a court to pass a sentence, owing to
minor lapses found in nearly every case. However, the sheer extremity and
irreversibility of the penalty justifies – legally and morally – a burden of proof
so high, that no person should be condemned to death unless there is absolute,
objective certainty of their guilt.

V. CONCLUSION
The theory of residual doubt is one that does not yet have deep roots in the
Indian legal thought. The theory attempts to displace the existing notion of a
trial with a bifurcated version, with an independent stage for both guilt and
sentencing. The theory is sympathetic to the fact that no human - whether a
judge of the court or even a member of a jury - is omniscient, and there are
organic layers that may creep into one’s mind while determining the culpability of an individual in a given case.
When the question is of charging an individual with a mere fine, the human
mind finds it easy to overlook minute inconsistencies. When it is that of divesting one of their liberty by sentencing one to a term in jail, the mind is sharper
and more critical to these flaws. But when the question becomes that of deprivation of a life, can there be any moral or legal justification for leaving room
for the slightest error?
Aside from a reflection on underlying moral platitudes, this theory is conscious of the most fundamental legal principle of fairness. It attempts to reduce
the arbitrariness in the procedure established by law, by increasing the threshold of certainty in cases where an individual may be condemned to death.
Given its fullest meaning - denial of death penalty where there is any doubt,
howsoever minute and irrelevant - this theory would in effect lead to the substantive erasure of the capital punishment in a legal system, or at the very least
be directed most sparingly. Within the realm of capital punishment, this theory
thus holds the potential of being a real lifesaver.
Unfortunately, theory and practice seldom align with each other. In both
American and Indian law, residual doubt continues to exist as a mitigating circumstance, but its application reveals a divergent position on what constitutes
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doubt. The error in creating new parameters without elucidating their standard
only acts in a fashion counterproductive to a death penalty trial, as it widens
the subjective discretion in each case.
The Indian law on death penalty is shambolic - even at the most preliminary level of whether a balancing or a criminal test ought to be employed.
Further, the complete lack of guidelines and training to trial courts enable
improper application of precedents, which often results in an individual waiting
on the side-lines of the death row for decades.
Despite the recommendations adduced in the Law Commission’s Report in
2015 for abolishing the death penalty, neither the judicial nor the legislative
wings of the government have demonstrated any inclination to pay heed to
such a recommendation. Thus, the introduction of a more well-defined iteration of this theory along with clearer guidelines could, until such time that the
death penalty prevails over the legal conscience, provide a greater burden of
responsibility in such cases.
As a concluding thought, it would be apposite to recall the words of Justice
Bhagwati in his evocative dissent in the Bacchan Singh case, wherein he stated
that “There is nothing like complete objectivity in the decision making process
and especially so, when this process involves making of decision in the exercise of judicial discretion.” While truer words could not be uttered, the theory
of residual doubt might act as a reminder to a judge that their lack of complete
objectivity and knowledge should humble them in their exercise of discretion.

